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Abstract 
When a firm imports inputs from foreign countries, the management faces two options: buying 
from unaffiliated firms or insourcing the foreign production. This paper suggests that this decision 
directly affects domestic production because international insourcing affects the operational 
flexibility and the firms’ opportunities for accessing knowledge and capabilities developed abroad. 
Empirical results based on firm-level data of Swiss firms confirm this hypothesis. Concretely, the 
insourcing of international production increases domestic productivity, decreases (at least in the 
short run) domestic employment and possibly investments. In line with transaction cost literature, 
we observe that contractual hazards moderate these effects. 
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1 Introduction 
As globalization has become an undisputed reality, management decisions nowadays more frequently refer to 
action on foreign markets. In order to improve the quality of these decisions, it is thus not surprising that not 
only the international business literature but also the strategic management literature analyzes the 
consequences of the managers’ foreign markets decisions for the firms’ domestic production (see, e.g., 
Bertrand and Capron 2015, Larsen et al. 2013, Zhang et al. 2010). 
Along with the significant increase in international trade in inputs since 1960 (Hummels et al. 2001), the 
analysis of how importing inputs affects domestic production has become a key theme within the international 
business literature (see Olsen 2006 for a review of the literature). Hence, we have a quite good understanding 
of how offshoring1 affects domestic production. Moreover, there is a substantial make versus buy literature 
that looks at governance choices (see Grant 1996, Leiblein et al. 2002, Veugelers and Cassiman 1999). In this 
paper, we combine these two strands of the literature by analyzing how the choice between different 
governance modes of foreign production, i.e. international insourcing vs. international outsourcing, affects 
domestic production. We argue that not only offshoring, but also the decision to insource foreign input 
production, i.e. to opt for an internal rather than external governance mode, affects domestic production 
because international insourcing affects the operational flexibility and the firms’ opportunities for accessing 
knowledge developed abroad. 
While a broad literature analyzes the effect of international production as a whole, it remains largely 
unknown whether international insourcing affects domestic production differently than international 
outsourcing. To our knowledge, the only exception is the paper of Rodríguez and Nieto (2015). Based on a 
sample of Spanish SMEs, these authors compare the effect of insourcing and outsourcing of international R&D 
activities on domestic firm growth. R&D is an important but very specific type of input that mostly accounts 
for a small share of total inputs. The present study adds to this literature by analyzing the effect of insourcing 
and outsourcing of total imports on domestic production based on a sample of Swiss firms. Switzerland is a 
particularly interesting case for such an analysis. Due to its high labor costs, downstream trade flows from 
                                                 
1 In some of the literature, the term outsourcing is used for all imports, i.e. for all types of international activities that are 
external to the domestic firm. In order to avoid confusion, this paper uses the term international outsourcing only for 
international activities that are external to the firm, i.e. imports that stem from unaffiliated foreign firms. International 
activities as a whole is denoted as offshoring.  
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foreign countries are important to remain competitive. Accordingly, it is likely that the performance of the 
parent companies in Switzerland strongly depends on their international activities. Moreover, in line with the 
transaction cost literature which suggests that optimal firm boundaries depend on contractual hazards, we argue 
that contractual hazards are an important moderator of the effect of international insourcing on domestic 
production. To the best of our knowledge, this moderating effect has not been analyzed so far. 
In order to empirically analyze the effect of the firms’ international insourcing decisions, we include the 
firms’ share of imports from affiliated suppliers in total imports (international insourcing share) in equations 
of domestic firm performance. To get a comprehensive picture of how international insourcing affects the 
domestic production process, we complement the analysis of firm productivity by investigating the effects on 
further relevant domestic production inputs such as capital (in form of investment expenditures) and labor 
inputs.  
The results indicate that international insourcing in terms of imports of inputs from affiliated firms of Swiss 
multinational corporations (MNC) abroad increases domestic productivity. Furthermore, the findings suggest 
a negative relationship between international insourcing share and domestic employment and investments. 
However, these short-term negative effects on production inputs might be offset in the long-run by the 
productivity gains of domestic production. Moreover, our empirical results indeed confirm that contractual 
hazards moderate the effect of insourcing foreign input production. This broad picture of productivity increase 
and input decrease is consistent with the theoretical framework suggesting that insourcing foreign inputs allows 
firms characterized by high contractual hazards to focus on their core competencies and dynamic capabilities.  
2 Conceptual framework 
The broader theoretical framework of the present study is given by the theory of the international enterprise, 
particularly the internalization theory of the international enterprise as formulated in the work of Casson and 
Buckley (see, e.g., surveys of the respective literature in Buckley and Strange 2015, Buckley 2009 and Casson 
et al. 2009; see also Jensen et al. 2013). Internalization is defined as the theoretical approach that “explains 
how the boundaries of firms are set at the margin where the advantages of internal coordination are just offset 
by the costs of supplanting external markets” (Casson et al. 2009, p. 236). In this context the research focus is 
directed to questions of location, coordination and control of geographically dispersed activities, i.e. questions 
about the governance of the “global factory” (Buckley and Strange 2015). Key issues in the analysis of the 
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multinational enterprise are according to Buckley and Strange (2015) the “fine-slicing” and relocation of 
activities along the value chain, increased internalization of knowledge-intensive activities and increased 
externalization of control of less knowledge-intensive operations. Evidence on the line of the internalization 
reasoning was offered recently in a study based on offshoring operations of 263 multinational companies from 
15 European countries (Linares-Navarro et al. 2014). The most important finding is that core activities are 
typically internalized, while non-core activities are outsourced. In a further recent paper comparing the 
governance modes of offshoring activities of German and U.S. firms Hutzschenreuter et al. (2011) found that 
firms make their governance decisions based on the institutional environment, the surrounding population of 
similar firms, and firm-specific characteristics. 
The economic impact of the governance structure of the international enterprise, which is the topic of the 
present study, is mostly analyzed for the entire enterprise or for the foreign affiliates in the host countries, but 
much less for the part of the firm in the origin country. For this more specific research question, the present 
study builds on the offshoring literature, which analyses the impact of the ratio of imported inputs over costs 
on domestic performance (Feenstra and Hanson 1999, Görg and Hanley, 2005a). The offshoring literature 
distinguishes two channels through which imported inputs affect the domestic production, which we label the 
flexibility channel and the knowledge sourcing channel (see, e.g., Bustinza-Sanchez et al. 2010, Girma and 
Görg 2004). In contrast to the offshoring literature, the focus of this paper is not on the impact of total imported 
inputs, but on whether imports from affiliated suppliers (international insourcing) have the same effect as 
imports from unaffiliated suppliers (international outsourcing). In the following, we argue that the channels 
through which the mix of these two types of imports affect domestic production are the same as for total 
imported inputs. However, the following theoretical considerations suggest that international insourcing 
differently affects both the flexibility channel and the knowledge sourcing channel as compared to international 
outsourcing.  
2.1 Flexibility channel 
Compared to domestic production, international activities increase the flexibility of relocation processes 
(Kogut 1983). Hence, importing inputs may affect domestic production as it increases flexibility by allowing 
firms to relocate relatively inefficient processes to another country where they can be produced at lower costs. 
The increased operating flexibility of firms with international activities can primarily be observed in times of 
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strong fluctuations of economic activities, as it allows firms to quickly shift production capacity from locations 
with rising factor costs to countries with lower factor costs (Belderbos et al. 2014, Lampel and Giachetti 2013, 
Fisch and Zschoche 2012, Kogut and Kulatilaka 1994). Empirical studies support the evidence that firms with 
international activities make use of operational flexibility by adjusting their value chain activities as a response, 
for example, to exchange rate fluctuations (see, e.g., Song 2015, Lee and Song 2012), changing labour costs 
(see, e.g., Belderbos and Zou 2007) or an economic crisis (see, e.g., Chung et al. 2010, Lee and Makhija 2009).  
Complementing the offshoring literature, we expect flexibility gains of international activities to differ 
between international insourcing and international outsourcing, depending on the size of contractual hazards. 
Analyzing the determinants of optimal firm boundaries, the transaction cost (e.g., Williamson, 1975, Oaxley, 
1997) and property rights (e.g. Grossman and Hart, 1986) literatures suggest that incomplete contractibility of 
transactions that involve assets that cannot be redeployed at the same price outside the transaction – due, for 
example, to asset specificity – could create contractual hazards. These contractual hazards render market 
solutions, i.e. outsourcing, imperfect and hence increase the relative benefits of hierarchy, i.e. insourcing (e.g., 
Williamson, 1988). Concretely, relocating processes that are characterized by contractual hazards to 
unaffiliated foreign firms, i.e. international outsourcing, induces two types of costs, namely coordination costs 
and costs in terms of knowledge leakage (Handley and Benton 2013, David and Han 2004, Jain and Thietart 
2014, Jiang et al. 2007, Leiblein and Miller 2003). First, contractual hazards induce the need for increased 
communication and coordination. Intra-firm trade creates internal product markets that enable member firms 
to exchange their products at relatively low costs and thus reduce communication and coordination costs 
relative to trade between unaffiliated firms (Song 2015). Hence, the relocation to unaffiliated foreign firms 
increases communication and coordination costs to ensure that the supplied products meet the demands of the 
domestic firm. Second, specific assets often embody firm-specific knowledge. Therefore, relocation to 
unaffiliated firms may lead to unwanted knowledge leakage (Williamson, 1991, Handley and Benton 2013). 
These costs deter firms from shifting production processes. Hence, they limit the realization of potential gains 
from flexibility in terms of reducing input costs. We thus expect higher flexibility gains from insourcing 
compared with outsourcing if contractual hazards are high. 
Contrasting this view, one could argue that gains from flexibility might be larger for outsourcing than for 
insourcing because firms can easier shift production to other suppliers if the international activities are 
outsourced rather than insourced (Rodríguez and Nieto 2015, Jiang et al. 2007, Farrell 2005). For example, we 
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observe that the clothing and shoes industry, industries that typically face low contractual hazards, tend to use 
outsourcing more often than insourcing, which may be due to higher operational flexibility.  
Hence, insourcing international activities can either increase or decrease production flexibility, where the 
direction of this effect depends on the relevance of contractual hazards. If contractual hazards are low, then 
coordination and communication costs and the threat of knowledge leakage are also low, which reduces 
flexibility gains from insourcing and thus makes outsourcing more attractive. Conversely, if contractual 
hazards are important, insourcing international activities is relatively more attractive because international 
outsourcing induces higher costs.  
To sum up, we hypothesize increased flexibility gains from insourcing for domestic production if 
contractual hazards are high, but decreased flexibility gains if contractual hazards are low. From this we 
conclude that (a) the firms’ international insourcing share shows a positive flexibility effect on domestic 
production if contractual hazard is high, and (b) contractual hazards moderate the flexibility effect of 
insourcing on domestic production. 
2.2 Knowledge sourcing channel  
A growing body of literature argues that offshoring not only serves to reduce costs of inputs, but that firms 
also seek to develop new and diverse knowledge and capabilities abroad (see, e.g. , Chung and Alcácer 2002, 
Berry 2006, Berry and Kaul, 2015). Hence, the second channel discussed in the offshoring literature refers to 
knowledge gains from international activities that may affect home production. Berry and Kaul (2015) model 
the production function in a simple fashion as 𝑄𝑄 = 𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃, where Q represents output, x denotes the amount of 
inputs and 𝜃𝜃 captures productivity of the firm. Hence, the knowledge sourcing channel refers to three types of 
knowledge and capabilities that may affect the productivity parameter 𝜃𝜃, namely (a) inputs from foreign 
countries that may be of higher quality than those available at home, (b) foreign production that may lead to a 
technology transfer to home plants, and (c) knowledge referring to the local environment that may provide 
access to new markets.  
The transaction cost literature provides two reasons why knowledge and capabilities can be transferred and 
exploited more efficiently through intra-organizational networks than through external market mechanisms 
(Berry 2014, Peltokorpi and Vaara 2014, Tallman and Chacar 2011).  
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First, a large portion of external knowledge is tacit and thereby non-tradable. Hence, knowledge transfer 
requires frequent interpersonal contacts (Chung and Yeaple 2008, Gupta and Govindarajan 2000). Since 
communication costs are lower and interpersonal contacts are more common within firm boundaries, 
international insourcing facilitates knowledge sourcing. Furthermore, knowledge sourcing requires that the 
foreign firm has an interest in knowledge sourcing. The incentives to knowledge sourcing are clearly larger in 
the case of international insourcing. Hence, the incentives faced by the foreign firm provide an additional 
argument why knowledge sourcing is larger in the case of international insourcing than in the case of 
international outsourcing (Chi 2015, Elango 2005, Kogut and Zander 1996, Speckbacher et al. 2014). Due to 
these reasons, insourcing international activities facilitates accessing knowledge and capabilities that require 
cooperation between the domestic and foreign firm. This is particularly true for production processes but also 
matters in cases where complete reverse engineering remains impossible. Furthermore, cooperation matters 
particularly regarding the development of knowledge and capabilities related to the local environment. 
Second, international insourcing poses a smaller risk of unwanted knowledge transfer due to information 
leakage or appropriability problems than international outsourcing. This deters the domestic firm from sharing 
knowledge with unaffiliated foreign firms, which in turn reduces quality improvements in inputs because they 
cannot be adapted ideally to the production process of the domestic firm. This is also in line with the 
internalization theory of the multinational firm (Buckley and Casson 1976), which describes internalization as 
the replacement of imperfect external markets by more efficient internal markets, and argues that primarily 
knowledge intensive activities are internalized (Buckley and Strange 2015).  
On the other hand, one could argue that outsourcing modes provide firms with access to a wide range of 
suppliers with the latest technologies which may increase knowledge sourcing. Moreover, outsourcing to 
specialized suppliers permits firms to complement their own resources and absorb new knowledge that would 
be unavailable in any other way (Rodríguez and Nieto 2015). We hypothesize that these aspects dominate 
primarily in case contractual hazards are not important. 
In sum, we thus hypothesize increased knowledge sourcing from insourcing for domestic production if 
contractual hazards are high, but decreased knowledge sourcing if contractual hazards are low. From this we 
conclude that (a) the firms’ insourcing share shows a positive knowledge effect on domestic production if 
contractual hazard is high, and (b) contractual hazards moderate the knowledge effect of insourcing on 
domestic production. 
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2.3 Expected effects of a firm’s international insourcing share  
The previous discussion shows that the theory does not offer clear predictions about whether a firm’s 
international insourcing share, i.e. the share of imports from affiliated suppliers in total imports, strengthen or 
weaken the two channels through which the import of inputs can affect domestic production. However, based 
on the transaction cost literature, we expect that both channels are moderated by the firms’ contractual 
hazards.2 Concretely, both the knowledge and the flexibility gains for domestic production are expected to be 
larger if contractual hazards are high. Hence, we expect that contractual hazards moderate the effect of a firm’s 
international insourcing share, which is also in line with the internalization theory of the multinational firm, 
which predicts that primarily knowledge-intensive activities, i.e. activities that are typically characterized by 
high contractual hazards, are internalized, while more routine activities tend to be outsourced (Buckley and 
Strange 2015).  
 
H1: Contractual hazards: Contractual hazards moderate the effect of a firm’s international insourcing share, 
i.e. the share of imports from affiliated suppliers in total imports, on domestic production. 
 
As described in the beginning, we will use a sample of Swiss firms in order to test this prediction 
empirically. The Swiss industrial production structure is characterized by high shares of value-added generated 
by complex high-tech products, mostly pharmaceuticals, electronic devices, instruments, and devices of 
medical technology.3 The production of such goods creates relatively high contractual hazards. Based on the 
discussion above, we hypothesize insourcing to increase knowledge sourcing and flexibility gains if 
contractual hazards are high. Due to the relatively high contractual hazards of the average Swiss firm, an 
increase in the share of imported inputs received from affiliated foreign companies is thus hypothesized to 
                                                 
2 While this insight allows us to formulate hypotheses regarding the relationship between international insourcing share 
and domestic production, we remain agnostic regarding the relative magnitude of the two potential channels. 
3 According to OECD statistics, Switzerland has the largest manufacturing value added share of high-tech products among 
European countries (2010: 62.5% versus 61.4% in Germany and 54.2% in Denmark). Also the export share of high-tech 
products is the highest among European countries (2013: 48.9%). This share has increased significantly since 2000 (from 
32.3% to 48.9%), which can be interpreted as a hint that less complex production in low-tech industries has been relocated 
at a large extent to foreign destinations. This is in accordance with the decrease of the value added share of low-tech 
industries such as textiles, cloth and food industry in the last fifteen years. The Swiss economy has also a large value 
added share of knowledge-intensive service industries such as financial services, computer services, and engineering, so 
that the entire knowledge-intensive sector of the economy amounted 2010 to 48.6% of business sector value added 
(Germany: 50.2; USA: 52.6%). 
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enhance the effect of both channels on domestic production in our sample that is representative to the Swiss 
industry structure.4 This is similar to what the offshoring literature predicts for an increase in the total import 
share. The direction of how the firm’s insourcing share affects domestic production should thus be the same 
as for a firm’s import share. Therefore, we can thus make use of the existing theoretical and empirical evidence 
on how domestic production is affected by total import shares in order to formulate our hypotheses on the 
impact of the firms’ international insourcing share on domestic production. 
 
Productivity of domestic production 
The general prediction is that by increasing a firm’s ability to relocate inefficient production stages from the 
home country to foreign countries (flexibility channel), and to transfer knowledge from foreign countries to 
the parent company (knowledge sourcing channel), the import of inputs increases the productivity of domestic 
production (see, e.g., Görg et al. 2008). The empirical findings generally support this hypothesis by showing 
that importing inputs increases productivity (Girma and Görg 2004, Abramovsky and Griffith 2009, Amiti and 
Wei 2003) and profitability (Görzig and Stephan 2002, Görg and Hanley 2004, 2011, Bustinza-Sanchez et al. 
2010). However, the empirical results suggest that these effects might differ between material and service 
inputs (Görzig and Stephan 2002, Görg and Hanley 2011, Abramovsky and Griffith 2009, Amiti and Wei 
2003), between small and large firms (Görg and Hanley 2004) and between exporters and non-exporters (Görg 
et al. 2008).  
Based on the prediction that not only the import of inputs but also the share of international insourcing 
increases the effect of the flexibility and knowledge sourcing channels if contractual hazards are high, we 
formulate the following hypothesis for our sample of Swiss firms:  
 
H2: Productivity: A firm’s international insourcing share, i.e. the share of imports from affiliated suppliers in 
total imports, increases the productivity of domestic production. 
 
Inputs of domestic production 
                                                 
4 In countries where firms with less specific assets dominate, it is likely that the effect goes in the opposite direction. 
Based on data for Spanish SMEs Rodríguez and Nieto (2015) for example find that international insourcing of R&D 
shows a significantly lower effect on sales growth than international outsourcing of R&D. 
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The import of inputs is expected to increase productivity through increasing flexibility (flexibility channel) 
and/or through the use of qualitatively better inputs (knowledge sourcing channel). In the short run this should 
reduce the use of production inputs (i.e., labor, capital) in domestic production. This effect may change to a 
positive one in the long run, because the increased overall productivity would enhance a firm’ s international 
competitiveness and, as a consequence, would stimulate also production and sales at home (see, e.g., Engel 
and Procher 2013, Kohler and Wrona 2010). As we observe the development of the firms’ performance over 
a period of three years, the focus of our paper, however, is on short time effects.  
     Only few studies empirically investigate the relationship between offshoring and domestic production 
inputs. Based on plant-level data for the Irish electronics sector, Görg and Hanley (2005b) find that 
international outsourcing negatively affects labor demand. Moreover, Lo Turco and Maggioni (2012) find that 
the import of intermediates on average has a negative effect on labor demand of Italian firms.  
Because we expect that not only the import of inputs but also the share of international insourcing increases 
the effect of the flexibility and knowledge sourcing channels if contractual hazards are high, we also expect to 
observe a negative net-effect of international insourcing on domestic production inputs for our sample of Swiss 
firms.  
 
H3: Domestic Production Inputs: A firm’s international insourcing share, i.e. the share of imports from 
affiliated suppliers in total imports, decreases the use of production inputs (i.e., employment, investment in 
capital) of domestic production. 
3 Data 
The study is based on firm data that has been collected in a postal survey on the “Internationalization of the 
Swiss Economy” carried out in spring 2010. The questionnaire has been addressed to a sample of 4533 firms 
with at least five employees covering all business sectors of the Swiss economy. The sample is stratified by 29 
industries and three firm size classes (with full coverage of large companies) drawn from the population of 
firms with more than five employees. The survey yielded valid information for 1921 enterprises, implying an 
overall response rate of 42%, what is satisfactory given the very demanding questionnaire of seven pages.  
Nevertheless, this highlights a drawback of survey data, namely the question whether response behavior is 
random or whether it induces a selection bias due to unit non-response. However, due to selective reminding 
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calls among firms that were underrepresented in a first round of data collection, the final structure of the 
responding firms in terms of firm size and industry affiliation is quite similar to that of the underlying sample 
(see Arvanitis et al. 2011). This provides first evidence that possible non-response bias remain limited for this 
survey. In addition, 713 non-responding firms were contacted by phone, eliciting a response rate of 88%. This 
non-response analysis provided no evidence of selection bias in terms of internationalization as the share of 
MNCs within the responding firms is representative for the whole sample.  
As firms without FDI cannot insource international inputs, the share of imports that these firms receive 
from their foreign subsidiaries is zero per definition. Hence, these firms could be included in the analysis as 
well. However, while this would significantly increase the number of observations, this would add a lot of 
noise. Furthermore, these firms had to start FDI first in order to be able to switch from external to internal 
foreign production. Hence, our main regressions are restricted to the 545 firms that reported foreign affiliates 
(about 28% of all valid responses), i.e. the firms that were engaged themselves in direct foreign activities 
through FDI (see Section 5.3 for alternative regressions based on the full sample). In what follows we refer to 
these firms as MNCs. Foreign owned firms are considered only if their local headquarters in Switzerland have 
their own FDI activities. As their performance may be affected by their international network, our models 
control for foreign owned firms. Even though the above discussion suggests that unit non-response is not a 
serious problem for our survey, firms might be selective in terms of answering particular questions, leading to 
the so-called item non-response problem with respect to important variables. In our sample, item-non-response 
reduces the sample substantially to 264 observations. 
Using data from a postal survey further suffers from a higher degree of measurement error than 
administrative data. This is particularly relevant in terms of the common method bias, which arises because 
both the dependent and independent variable are assessed by the same respondent, giving rise to a potential 
correlation in the subjective measurement error (see, e.g., Chang et al. 2010). However, three characteristics 
help to address these issues of measurement error. First, the dependent variables refer to objective numbers, 
which the respondents ideally gain from the accountancy. Second, the complexity of the multivariate 
estimations render the issue of a common method bias less troublesome. Third, the instrumental variable 
approach using industry averages to instrument insourcing intensity helps to alleviate the bias arising due to 
measurement error in the main independent variable.   
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On average the MNCs in our sample have 814 employees, whereupon the distribution is strongly right-
skewed. 51% of the firms have between 50 and 250 employees and only 22% employ more than 250 
employees. 72% of the MNCs belong to the manufacturing sector, 26% to the service sector and only 2% to 
the construction sector. In the service sector the sub-sector of modern (knowledge-intensive) services (e.g., 
banking and insurance, business services) has a larger share than the sub-sector of traditional services (e.g., 
trade, hotels and catering) (53% vs. 47%). In the manufacturing sector there are more high-tech (e.g., 
chemicals, pharmaceuticals, electrical equipment) than low-tech firms (66% vs. 34%).  
Referring to the parent companies the survey yielded information on basic firm characteristics (e.g., firm age, 
industry affiliation), firm performance and activity level (e.g., sales, value added, number of employees) and 
innovative activities.5 Descriptive statistics for all model variables based on the estimation sample is presented 
in Table A.1 in the appendix.  
 
Figure 1: International insourcing share, i.e. the share of imports received from foreign affiliates  
 
Most important for this study is the information on the firms’ international insourcing share. In contrast to 
the offshoring literature (see, e.g., Feenstra and Hanson 1999), we are thus not interested in the effect of the 
total import share, but in the share of imports from affiliated suppliers in total imports. This information is 
based on an ordinal variable with nine categories (0%, 1-5%, 6-10%, 11-15%, 16-20%, 21-30%, 31-40%, 41-
50% and 51-100%) that measure the share of goods and services that the Swiss parent company imported from 
their foreign subsidiaries. Figure 1 presents the descriptive statistics for this variable. The figure shows that 
firm-internal imports are of relative low importance compared with firm-external imports. 37% of the MNCs 
                                                 
5 The questionnaire is available in German, French and Italian on www.kof.ethz.ch/en/surveys/structural-surveys/other-
surveys/survey-internationalisation-swiss-economy-2010/. 
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do not have internal trade imports at all and about 75% of the MNCs receive less than 10% of the imports from 
their foreign subsidiaries. 
4 Econometric framework 
4.1 Model specification 
In this section we discuss the specification of the variables and the econometric methodology. Table 1 and 
Tables A.1 and A.2 in the appendix display the variable definitions, summary statistics and cross-correlations 
of variables, respectively. 
The main right-hand variable of interest is the MNCs’ international insourcing share in 2008 (Insourcing 
Share).6 In order to capture the broad effects of a firm’s international insourcing share on production output 
and input at home, we examine three dependent variables yj, (j=1,2,3), namely one measure of production 
output and two measures of production inputs. Value added per full-time equivalent (FTE) employee (VA per 
Emp) measures productivity. Measures of production input include capital input measured by gross investment 
expenditures in Switzerland (Inv), labor input is captured by the number of FTE employees (Emp).  
We estimate the effect of a firm’s international insourcing share (Insourcing Share) on the jth dependent 
variable yji, of firm i in t=2008 using OLS: 
 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗,0 + 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗,1𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗,2𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐼𝐼𝑙𝑙𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑙𝑙𝐼𝐼 𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑎𝐼𝐼𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗,3𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐼𝐼𝑙𝑙𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑎𝐼𝐼𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗,4𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡, 
 
where εj,i,t represents the normally distributed error term with mean zero. The matrix Xj,i,t entails firm 
characteristics specific to each dependent variable. Concretely, following standard specification of simple 
production functions (see, e.g., Griliches and Mairesse 1995), estimates for productivity (VA per Emp) include 
measures of production inputs for quantity (Emp) and quality (Share High Qual) of labor inputs, capital inputs 
per FTE employee (Inv per Emp) and R&D expenditures per FTE employee (R&D per Emp). Controlling for 
                                                 
6 In order to ease the interpretation of coefficients, the original ordinal variable enters as the log of the midpoint of each 
category of the ordinal scale (0%, 3%, 8%, 13%, 18%, 25.5%, 35.5%, 45.5%, and 75.5%). Using alternatively the original 
ordinal variable (1-9) or dummy variables indicating whether insourced imports is zero, low (1%-20%) or high (21%-
100%), yield qualitatively similar results. These results can be obtained from the authors upon request. 
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R&D intensity matters particularly because it might affect both international insourcing intensity (see, e.g., 
David and Han 2004) and productivity. 
The specification of the equations for capital input approximated by investment expenditures (Investments) 
as dependent variable contains controls for output measured by value added (VA), the number of employees 
(Emp), and R&D (R&D). 
The equations for labor inputs (Employees) include, besides controls for output (VA) and R&D (R&D), 
measures for the average wages (Wage Total) in accordance with standard specification of labor demand 
equations (see, e.g., Hamermesh 1993). 
Moreover, besides internally or externally sourcing from foreign countries, firms may also source externally 
from the home country (Gray et al. 2011). As the different sourcing options are likely to be correlated, the 
exclusion of one option may bias the effect of the others. In addition, the results may be biased as imports from 
affiliated parties as a proportion of total imports, our main variable, may be correlated with a firm’s level of 
total inputs. In order to deal with these issues, we add a control for total input share (Input Share) that captures 
the effect of external sourcing in general.  
Further firm characteristics controlled for in all output and input equations include firm age (Age), whether 
the company is foreign-owned (Foreign), whether the firm has recently experienced company restructuring in 
the form of spinoffs (Spinoff) or merging (Merger), the intensity of price (Price Competition) and non-price 
competition (Non-Price Competition)7, and the industry affiliation (NACE 2-digit). Moreover, as insourcing 
share may show different effects for firms with more FDI experience than for firms with little FDI experience 
(Rabbiosi and Santangelo 2013), we control whether the firm already started their FDI activities before 1990 
(FDI 1990) or between 1990 and 2000 (FDI 2000). Finally, as macro-economic conditions vary across 
countries, we add ten indicator variables for the locations of FDI activities (Location variables) to account for 
differences in the host countries.  
                                                 
7 This information stems from a prior survey of the firm conducted in 2009 in the course of the KOF Innovation Survey 
(for more information, see https://www.kof.ethz.ch/en/surveys/structural-surveys/innovation-survey/). This information 
was used to construct industry averages of price and non-price competition on the 3-digit industry level (NACE Revision 
2). 
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4.2 Econometric issues 
Though we control for a broad range of observable firm characteristics, concerns regarding potential 
endogeneity due to unobserved heterogeneity and reverse causality remain. This might be the case because 
high fixed costs could deter low-productivity firms from engaging in international insourcing as suggested by 
the theoretical model of Antràs and Helpman (2004) and supported by some empirical evidence (e.g., Corcos 
et al. 2013, Haller 2012, Kohler and Smolka 2011a,b, Federico 2010, Nunn and Trefler 2008, Tomiura 2007, 
while Defever and Toubal (2007) find no such evidence).  
We attempt to tackle these identification issues in two ways. First, in order to address unobserved 
heterogeneity, we exploit the fact that the dependent variables were measured for the years 2003 and 2008. 
This allows us to include the lagged dependent variable yjit-1, i.e. the value of the jth output / input measure in 
the year 2003, in order to control for individual effects.8 
Secondly, in order to tackle potential reverse causality, we provide evidence based on a two stage least 
squares (2SLS) instrumental variable approach that instruments the firms’ international insourcing share by 
the respective industry averages.9  
Hence, though concerns regarding the causal interpretation of our results remain, controlling for unobserved 
heterogeneity by the use of lagged dependent variables in addition to exploiting an IV approach provides some 
evidence that the reported correlations reflect causal effects. The test results are discussed in detail in Section 
5.3. 
A further concern regarding the validity of our identification strategy is a potential selection bias due to the 
restriction of our sample to firms that have foreign affiliates. In order to test the relevance of such a bias, Table 
4 further reports estimates that employ the full sample of firms, exploiting the knowledge that the international 
insourcing share of firms that have no foreign affiliates is necessarily zero. The direct effect of having an 
affiliate on the output and input measures is captured in these estimates by a dummy variable. A comparison 
of the results is presented in Section 5.3. 
                                                 
8 Estimating a model with firm fixed effects is not possible because we observe international insourcing share in 2008 
only.  
9 While these estimates require dropping the industry dummies, they continue to account for unobserved heterogeneity 
across firms by including the lagged dependent variable. 
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5 Results 
5.1 Direct effects of foreign insourcing 
Before analyzing the potential moderating effect of contractual hazards as discussed in hypothesis 1, we focus 
on the direct effects of the variable Insourcing Share discussed in hypotheses 2 and 3. Table 2 displays our 
main results for three dependent variables. The main estimations account for unobserved heterogeneity by 
including the lagged dependent variable. Each column displays the results for one output / input measure. All 
models explain a substantial share of the variation in the dependent variable as shown by the R2 statistics 
between 0.78 and 0.98. This reflects the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable, but the models excluding 
the lagged dependent variable have high R2s as well (see Table 4). 
Assessing the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable in the model reveals that the coefficients of the 
variable Insourcing Share remain practically the same for productivity (VA per Emp), Investments, and 
Employees. Note that the insignificant correlation between the firms’ international insourcing share and 
productivity when we do not control for the lagged dependent variable (see Table 4) provides suggestive 
evidence that the significant main estimation results presented in Table 2 are not driven by reverse causality 
due to sorting of more productive firms into insourcing (Antràs and Helpman 2004). Since including the lagged 
dependent variable increases the precision of the estimates substantially, we focus the following discussion on 
the results of the main estimation with lagged dependent variables.  
 
Table 2 about here 
 
The results suggest that the performance of domestic production in Switzerland is affected by the firms’ 
international insourcing share. As predicted by hypothesis 2, the firms’ international insourcing share increases 
labor productivity measured by value added per employee (VA per Emp). 
Furthermore, capital input as measured by investment expenditures (Inv) and labor input (Emp) decrease 
with increasing international insourcing share. Thus, the net effects on employment and investment 
expenditures as they are captured by this firm cross-section seem to be negative. These findings support 
hypothesis 3, suggesting that productivity gains do not offset input reductions in the short run. This implies 
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that international insourcing is associated primarily with an increase of the efficiency of resources in domestic 
production in the short run.  
In order to analyze whether our main estimation results are driven by the extensive or intensive margin of 
insourcing, we additionally estimate a model that separately includes an indicator variable for the presence of 
insourcing (Insourcing Dummy) in addition to the share of insourcing (Insourcing Share) (see Table 4). The 
results suggest that our results are driven by the intensive margin rather than the extensive margin.  
5.2 The moderating effect of contractual hazards 
We make use of the heterogeneity in production of the firms included in our sample, in order to get an idea 
whether the contractual hazards of production really moderate the effect of a firm’s international insourcing 
share. Concretely, we test the suggested heterogeneity in two ways displayed in Table 3. First, we interact the 
firms’ international insourcing share with the firms’ R&D expenditures in Switzerland.10 Contractual hazards 
increase with R&D intensity because a) asset specificity increases in technological complexity and b) the risk 
of knowledge leakage rises. Hence, both the transaction cost literature (see David and Han, 2004, for an 
overview) and the economic literature (e.g. Arvanitis et al. 2013, Yeaple 2006, Zhao et al. 2004, Andersson 
and Fredriksson 2000, Cho 1990) use R&D intensity as a proxy for contractual hazards.  
Second, as the firms’ domestic and foreign contractual hazards may differ, we interact the international 
insourcing share with two variables that reflect the firms’ global contractual hazards. Concretely, the two 
variables measure the relevance of efficient knowledge protection (a) in the form of the ineffectiveness of 
informal measures to protect the firms’ innovations, and (b) by measuring whether lack of copyright and patent 
protection represents a strong hampering factor of international activities. This second type of proxies refers 
to the transaction cost literature suggesting that property rights uncertainty is especially important if contractual 
hazards are high and thus a lot of firm-specific knowledge is embodied in exchanged products and services 
(see, e.g., Corcos et al. 2013, Nunn and Trefler 2008). 
Although not all interaction terms turn out to be statistically significant, which is not that surprising given 
the relatively low number of observations, the significant results are all in line with hypothesis 1 (see Table 3). 
First, we observe that contractual hazards tend to increase the positive effect of international insourcing on 
                                                 
10 The results remain qualitatively the same when we additionally control for the firms’ R&D activities abroad to capture 
a potential correlation between contractual hazards of production at home and abroad. 
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domestic labor productivity. Second, contractual hazards magnifies the negative effect of international 
insourcing on the two measures of domestic production inputs, namely employment and investments.  
  
Table 3 about here 
5.3 Robustness tests 
Beside of reporting estimates excluding the lagged dependent variable and testing for whether our results are 
driven by the extensive or intensive margin of the insourcing share, Table 4 displays results that address two 
additional concerns regarding the estimates, namely sample selection and reverse causality. As discussed in 
the methodology section, controlling for the lagged dependent variables might be insufficient to account for 
endogeneity of the estimates due to potential reverse causality. Hence, Table 4 displays results in which the 
firms’ international insourcing share is instrumented. The 2-digit industry average of international insourcing 
share (Mean Insourcing Share) serves as the instrument in the IV Industry Average estimation. Since we need 
to drop industry affiliations dummies in these IV estimates, we further test whether excluding controls for 
industry affiliation affects our estimation results. This is not the case. Neither the direction nor the size of the 
different coefficients are significantly affected by this modification. We report the F-Statistics of the 
instruments to evaluate the strength of the instruments, whereby a value above about 10 suggests sufficient 
strength. Hence, the instruments seem to have sufficient strength. For all three models explaining productivity, 
material and labor input, respectively, the effect of insourcing share goes in the same direction as in the main 
estimates, i.e. we observe positive effects on productivity and negative effects on capital and labor input. In 
the productivity labor input models, the size of the effects is even slightly larger in the IV estimates compared 
with our main results. However, due to the low number of observations, instrumenting the insourcing variable 
reduces the estimation precision. While the positive effect of insourcing share on productivity still is 
statistically significant, the negative effect of insourcing share on the number of employees gets insignificant. 
 
Table 4 about here 
 
Finally, Table 4 contains evidence as to the occurrence of selection bias due to the fact that our dependent 
variable is only available for firms engaged in FDI. Since the international insourcing share of firms without 
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foreign affiliates is always 0, Table 4 provides estimates for the full sample by setting insourcing share to 0 if 
a firm does not have FDI. The estimates reveal a similar picture as in our main models presented in Table 2, 
i.e. a positive relationship with productivity and a significant negative relationship with investment 
expenditures and total number of employees. Moreover, the size of these effects only marginally differ. 
However, the significance of the effects is a bit lower, which may be due to the fact that the shares of imports 
from foreign subsidiaries is zero per definition for firms without FDI, and the inclusion of these firms thus 
primarily adds a lot of noise to the model (see discussion in Section 3). 
6 Discussion and conclusions 
This paper seeks to enhance the understanding of how the import of inputs affects domestic production. The 
impact of the import of inputs on domestic production has already been intensively discussed in the offshoring 
literature. However, this strand of the literature does not differentiate between different governance modes of 
foreign input production. In the first part of the paper, we present several arguments for why imports from 
affiliated suppliers are expected to affect domestic production differently than imports from unaffiliated 
suppliers and we also develop several hypotheses on how domestic firm productivity and production inputs 
are expected to be affected by the choice between these two governance modes. In line with transaction cost 
literature, we predict that contractual hazards moderate these effects. 
The second part of the paper tests our predictions empirically by including the share of imports from 
affiliated suppliers in total imports (international insourcing share) in equations for several measures of 
production output and production inputs. Concretely, we analyze the impact of a firm’s insourcing share on 
production output in terms of productivity in addition to measures of production inputs, namely investment 
expenditures as a measure of capital input and employment as a measure of labor input. The analysis is based 
on a sample of Swiss multinational corporations (MNC). 
Our empirical results confirm that the differentiation between the two governance modes is in fact important 
in order to understand how the import of inputs affects domestic production. The international insourcing share 
variable shows significant effects on all tested measures of domestic production. Hence, the results confirm 
that not only the firms’ offshoring decision per se, but also their decisions referring to the governance mode of 
the respective offshoring activities directly affects their domestic production. Furthermore, we show that a 
firm’s contractual hazards of production seem to be an important moderator of the insourcing effect. This 
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finding links the choice of the governance mode to the transaction cost theory, which suggests that contractual 
hazards increases the advantage of insourcing compared to outsourcing because of increased coordination costs 
and risk of unwanted knowledge transfer. Moreover, this finding indicates that the effect of international 
insourcing is likely to differ between countries with different levels of contractual hazards.11  
The main argument, why we expect that the governance modes differently affect domestic production, is 
that the insourcing of foreign input production magnifies both channels through which imported inputs affect 
domestic production if the firms’ contractual hazards are relatively high. First, international insourcing 
increases the firm’s operational flexibility, i.e. reducing input costs by improving the flexibility to relocate the 
value chain activities from unfavorable to favorable locations, even more than international outsourcing. 
Second, international insourcing also facilitates access to knowledge and capabilities developed abroad 
stronger than international outsourcing, thereby increasing input quality, creating knowledge transfer to home 
plants and accessing knowledge referring to the local environment. Hence, our empirical results are in line 
with this theoretical framework. However, the data does not allow us to measure these channels directly. 
Hence, future research should verify that these channels are indeed driving the relationship between 
international insourcing share and domestic production. Importantly, such an analysis should also clarify the 
relative magnitude of the two potential channels. 
A main finding of this study is that the insourcing of foreign input production positively affects the 
productivity of domestic production, at least if contractual hazards are relatively high. Hence, the insourcing 
of foreign input production makes the parent firm stronger and more productive, and thus seems to be a 
mechanism that managers can use to increase the productivity of their business. In order to understand the 
drivers of this positive productivity effect, we further analyze the relationship between the governance mode 
and measures of domestic production inputs. The results indicate that, at least in our short-run setting, the 
productivity gains come along with a decrease in domestic production inputs. The insourcing of foreign input 
production negatively affects both capital and labor inputs. These results are consistent with the view that 
                                                 
11 Rodríguez and Nieto (2015) argue that international outsourcing is linked to greater flexibility than international 
insourcing and they find some evidence for their prediction for Spanish SMEs, i.e. they find that international insourcing 
of R&D shows a significantly lower effect on sales growth than international outsourcing of R&D. This finding is in 
accordance with aggregated data that indicate that the average contractual hazards are lower for the average Spanish than 
for the average Swiss firm. An alternative explanation could be that the composition of the samples of firms used in the 
Spanish and Swiss study is quite different. While Rodríguez and Nieto (2015) focus on SMEs only, our sample entails 
the full population of firms. However, preliminary analysis suggests that our qualitative results hold for both small and 
large firms, though the sample reduction renders some coefficient estimates insignificant. 
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insourcing foreign input production allows the firm to focus on its core competencies and dynamic capabilities 
(Bustinza-Sanchez et al. 2010). Hence, at least from a macroeconomic perspective, the productivity gains have 
a flip side, as they may put people out of work. However, it is likely that these negative effects decrease or 
even change to a positive one in the longer run, because the increased overall productivity should stimulate 
also production and employment at home (see Engel and Procher 2013 or Kohler and Wrona 2010 for such an 
argumentation with respect to a firm’s offshoring activities). 
In an extension, we show that the insourcing effect is primarily driven by the intensity of international 
insourcing rather than by the discrete choice between international insourcing and outsourcing. This finding 
highlights that managers need to choose the optimal mix of insourcing foreign input production rather than 
choosing between the two governance modes in an ‘all or nothing’ way. These findings show the relevance of 
further investigation into the heterogeneity of the insourcing effect. 
The problems of possible endogeneity and reverse causality are addressed by using the lagged dependent 
variable as an additional right-hand variable in the main estimates. Robustness checks based on IV regressions, 
in which the variable Insourcing Share is instrumented by econometrically valid and economically justifiable 
instruments, indicate that our estimates could be interpreted as causal effects, to the extent that this is possible 
with cross-section data. Future research should use natural experiments to validate whether this interpretation 
is justified and whether the relationship found in this paper represents a causal relationship. Furthermore, the 
study relies on survey data, which might suffer from unit non-response, item non-response, measurement error 
and common method bias. Hence, future research should better use administrative data to confirm the 
suggested impact of the insourcing share on domestic production.   
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Tables: 
 
Table 1: Variable Definitions 
Variable Description 
Dependent Variables  
VA per Emp* Sales less intermediate inputs per FTE employee 
Investments* Gross investment  
Employees* Number of FTE employees 
Main Explanatory 
Variables 
 
Insourcing Dummy Binary variable taking the value 1 if insourcing share is larger than 0; and 0 otherwise 
Insourcing Share* Quasi-metric variable measuring the share of imports received from foreign affiliates 
constructed as the mean value of intervals in the original ordinal variable (0%, 3%, 8%, 
13%, 18%, 25.5%, 35.5%, 45.5%, 75.5%)     
Protection Problem Binary variable taking the value 1 if lack of copyright and patent protection represents a 
strong hampering factor of international activities; and 0 otherwise 
Protection 
Ineffectiveness 
Binary variable taking the value 1 if informal measures are ineffective in protecting 
innovation; and 0 otherwise 
Control Variables  
Share High Qual* Share of FTE employees with tertiary education 
R&D / R&D per Emp* R&D expenditures / R&D expenditures per FTE employee 
VA* Sales less intermediate inputs 
Inv per Emp* Gross investment per FTE employee 
Wage Total* Labor costs per FTE employee 
Input Share* Ratio of input costs and sales  
Age* Firm age in years 
Foreign Binary variable taking the value 1 if the firm is foreign owned; and 0 otherwise 
Spinoff Binary variable taking the value 1 if spinoffs have been brought out between 2003 and 
2008; and 0 otherwise  
Merger Binary variable taking the value 1 if mergers have occurred between 2003 and 2008; and 0 
otherwise  
Price Competition 3-digit industry average of the share of firms indicating strong price competition (Value of 
4 or 5 on a 5-point Likert scale) 
Non-Price Competition 3-digit industry average of the share of firms indicating strong price competition (Value of 
4 or 5 on a 5-point Likert scale)  
FDI 1990 Binary variable taking the value 1 if the firm has had its first FDI activities before 1990; 
and 0 otherwise 
FDI 2000 Binary variable taking the value 1 if the firm has had its first FDI activities between 1990 
and 2000; and 0 otherwise 
Location Old Europe Binary variable taking the value 1 if the firm has FDI activities in EU15 or EFTA 
countries; and 0 otherwise 
Location East Europe Binary variable taking the value 1 if the firm has FDI activities in Poland, Hungary, 
Slovenia, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Latvia, Lithuania or Estonia; and 0 otherwise 
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Location South Europe Binary variable taking the value 1 if the firm has FDI activities in Romania, Bulgaria, 
Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia, Macedonia or Albania; and 0 otherwise 
Location Russia Binary variable taking the value 1 if the firm has FDI activities in Russia, Ukraine or 
Belarus; and 0 otherwise 
Location USA Binary variable taking the value 1 if the firm has FDI activities in the USA or Canada; and 
0 otherwise 
Location Latin 
America 
Binary variable taking the value 1 if the firm has FDI activities in Latin American 
countries; and 0 otherwise 
Location China Binary variable taking the value 1 if the firm has FDI activities in China; and 0 otherwise 
Location Asia I Binary variable taking the value 1 if the firm has FDI activities in South-Korea, Taiwan, 
Hong-Kong or Singapore; and 0 otherwise 
Location Asia II Binary variable taking the value 1 if the firm has FDI activities in India, Thailand, 
Malaysia, Indonesia or the Philippines; and 0 otherwise 
Location Other Binary variable taking the value 1 if the firm has FDI activities in other countries; and 0 
otherwise 
Instrument  
Mean Insourcing 
Share* 
2-digit industry mean of insourcing share. 
Notes: * Indicates that the variable enters estimations as the natural logarithm of the original variable plus one. 
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Table 2: Full Results of Main Estimates 
 VA per Employee Investments Employees 
Insourcing Share 0.025** -0.073 -0.026** 
 (0.012) (0.049) (0.013) 
LDV (yt-1) 0.785*** 0.640*** 0.588*** 
 (0.044) (0.099) (0.051) 
R&D  0.027** 0.004 
  (0.013) (0.003) 
R&D per Emp -0.000   
 (0.005)   
VA  -0.157 0.388*** 
  (0.155) (0.049) 
Share High Qual 0.061**   
 (0.026)   
Employees -0.011 0.651***  
 (0.013) (0.193)  
Inv per Emp 0.015   
 (0.015)   
Wage Total  0.184 -0.244** 
  (0.131) (0.095) 
Input Share -0.107*** 0.037 0.099** 
 (0.033) (0.137) (0.039) 
Age 0.013 0.027 -0.019 
 (0.026) (0.091) (0.024) 
Foreign 0.075* -0.001 -0.053 
 (0.041) (0.155) (0.036) 
Spinnoff -0.036 -0.259 -0.023 
 (0.053) (0.166) (0.055) 
Merger 0.112** -0.279 -0.055 
 (0.050) (0.207) (0.053) 
Price Competition -0.263* 0.506 0.002 
 (0.137) (0.498) (0.177) 
Non-Price Competition 0.057 -0.003 0.030 
 (0.083) (0.302) (0.102) 
FDI 1990 0.066 -0.083 -0.113** 
 (0.052) (0.194) (0.050) 
FDI 2000 0.026 0.174 -0.071 
 (0.058) (0.241) (0.056) 
Location Old Europe -0.068* 0.165 0.076** 
 (0.036) (0.149) (0.035) 
Location East Europe -0.021 -0.194 -0.013 
 (0.041) (0.164) (0.039) 
Location South Europe 0.017 0.090 -0.014 
 (0.050) (0.233) (0.054) 
Location Russia 0.126 -0.304 -0.166** 
 (0.086) (0.242) (0.071) 
Location USA -0.032 0.350** 0.106** 
 (0.046) (0.173) (0.043) 
Location Latin America -0.038 -0.260 0.039 
 (0.078) (0.337) (0.070) 
Location China 0.039 0.036 -0.007 
 (0.049) (0.191) (0.042) 
Location Asia I -0.018 0.169 0.055 
 (0.054) (0.188) (0.042) 
Location Asia II 0.065 0.031 -0.066* 
 (0.042) (0.176) (0.034) 
Location Other -0.051 -0.361* -0.039 
 (0.053) (0.205) (0.057) 
Constant 2.704*** 2.166 -2.007** 
 (0.688) (2.129) (0.956) 
Industry Control Yes Yes  Yes 
N 264 264 264 
R2 0.776 0.851 0.975 
Notes: The table displays the OLS coefficient estimates and heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors. The estimations further include indicators for the 
2-digit industry. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Definitions, summary statistics and cross-
correlations are reported in Tables 1, A.1 and A.2, respectively. 
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Table 3: The Moderating Effect of Contractual Hazards of Production 
 
Dependent Variable  VA per Head Investments Employees 
Interaction Term with R&D Intensity    
 R&D per Head -0.007 0.011 -0.069** 
  (0.006) (0.102) (0.030) 
 Insourcing Share -0.006 -0.102 -0.023 
  (0.019) (0.106) (0.021) 
 R&D per Head*Insourcing Share 0.005* 0.004 -0.000 
  (0.003) (0.013) (0.003) 
 N 264 264 264 
 R2 0.778 0.851 0.976 
Interaction Term with Protection Problem    
 Protection Problem -0.032 0.601** 0.112** 
  (0.079) (0.254) (0.051) 
 Insourcing Share 0.017 0.006 -0.000 
  (0.013) (0.058) (0.013) 
 Protection Problem*Insourcing Share 0.030 -0.361*** -0.104*** 
  (0.033) (0.111) (0.027) 
 N 264 264 264 
 R2 0.777 0.857 0.977 
Interaction Term with Protection Ineffectiveness    
 Protection Ineffectiveness -0.047 -0.078 0.044 
  (0.050) (0.215) (0.045) 
 Insourcing Share -0.005 -0.022 0.008 
  (0.020) (0.093) (0.018) 
 Protection Ineffectiveness*Insourcing Share 0.045* -0.076 -0.052** 
  (0.025) (0.108) (0.024) 
 N 264 264 264 
 R2 0.775 0.848 0.975 
 Notes: The table displays the OLS coefficient estimates and heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. All estimates further control for 
the variables shown in Table 2. Definitions, summary statistics and cross-correlations of variables are reported in Tables 1, A.1 and A.2, respectively. 
***, ** and * denote statistical significance the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 4: Robustness of the Results  
Estimation  
VA per 
Employee Investments Employees 
Excluding LDV (yt-1)     
 Insourcing Share 0.006 -0.076 -0.009 
  (0.022) (0.069) (0.018) 
 Industry Control Yes Yes Yes 
 N 264 264 264 
 R2 0.345 0.699 0.940 
Extensive vs. 
Intensive Margin     
 Insourcing Dummy -0.051 0.143 0.038 
  (0.059) (0.219) (0.054) 
 Insourcing Share 0.039** -0.113 -0.037* 
  (0.019) (0.075) (0.021) 
 Industry Control Yes Yes Yes 
 N 264 264 264 
 R2 0.776 0.851 0.975 
Excluding Industry 
Control     
 Insourcing Share 0.028** -0.057 -0.027** 
  (0.013) (0.049) (0.013) 
 Industry Control No No No 
 N 264 264 264 
 R2 0.739 0.837 0.971 
Reverse causality: IV 
Industry Average     
 Insourcing Share 0.088*** -0.009 -0.078 
  (0.031) (0.179) (0.054) 
 Industry Control No No No 
 N 264 264 264 
 R2 0.620 0.518 0.562 
 F-Statisics 82.983 111.063 101.555 
Selection: Inclusion 
Non-FDI Firms     
 Insourcing Share 0.026** -0.065 -0.020 
  (0.012) (0.054) (0.013) 
 Industry Control Yes Yes Yes 
 N 1134 1133 1133 
 R2 0.674 0.643 0.967 
Notes: The table displays the OLS coefficient estimates and heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. The IV estimates display 
coefficients of a 2SLS estimate with standard errors clustered at industry level. The F-Statistics of the instruments provides a weak instrument test. All 
estimates further control for the variables shown in Table 2. Definitions, summary statistics and cross-correlations of variables are reported in Tables 
1, A.1 and A.2, respectively. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
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Appendix :  
 
Table A.1: Summary statistics 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent Variables      
VA per Emp 264 209245.1 157106 50017.05 1581818 
Inv in Mio. CHF 264 27 160 0 1670 
Employees 264 5.28 1.34 1.95 11.04 
Main Explanatory Variable      
Insourcing Dummy 264 0.625 0.49 0 1 
Insourcing Share 264 10.22 18.05 0 75 
R&D per Head 264 8969.87 14683.96 0 147901 
Protection Problem 264 0.20 0.40 0 1 
Protection Ineffectiveness 260 0.59 0.49 0 1 
Control Variables      
High Qual Share 264 27.97 20 2 100 
R&D in Mio. CHF 264 4.91 18.50 0 248 
VA in Mio. CHF 264 208 1030 0.91 10300.00 
Foreign 264 0.21 0.41 0 1 
Age 264 69.61 44 6.00 316.00 
Price Competition 264 0.67 0.1217401 0.25 1 
Non-Price Competition 264 3.21 0 2.375 3.71 
Spinoff 264 0.13 0.34 0 1 
Merger 264 0.14 0.34 0 1 
FDI 1990 264 0.63 0.49 0 1 
FDI 2000 264 0.24 0.43 0 1 
Location Old Europe 264 0.67 0.47 0 1 
Location East Europe 264 0.27 0.45 0 1 
Location South Europe 264 0.14 0.34 0 1 
Location Russia 264 0.05 0.22 0 1 
Location USA 264 0.22 0.42 0 1 
Location Latin America 264 0.08 0.27 0 1 
Location China 264 0.25 0.43 0 1 
Location Asia I 264 0.13 0.33 0 1 
Location Asia II 264 0.19 0.39 0 1 
Location Other 264 0.09 0.29 0 1 
Input Share 264 46.50 18.21 3 93 
Average Wage 264 104631 69012 3877 1063636 
Instruments      
Mean Insourcing Share 264 10.22 6.12 0 75 
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Table A.2: Correlation matrix 
 
VA per 
Emp 
Inv in 
Mio. 
CHF 
Employe
es 
Insourci
ng 
Dummy 
Insourci
ng Share 
R&D 
per Head 
Protectio
n 
Problem 
Protecti
on 
Ineffect
iveness 
VA per Emp 1.00        
Inv in Mio. CHF 0.04 1.00       
Employees -0.02 0.51 1.00      
Insourcing Dummy 0.09 -0.06 0.06 1.00     
Insourcing Share 0.13 -0.07 -0.09 0.44 1.00    
R&D per Head 0.18 -0.06 0.06 0.01 0.11 1.00   
Protection Problem 0.09 -0.07 -0.07 0.20 0.17 0.09 1.00  
Protection 
Ineffectiveness 0.08 0.06 0.02 -0.06 0.09 -0.05 -0.08 1.00 
High Qual Share 0.22 -0.01 -0.05 0.06 0.07 0.35 -0.03 -0.08 
R&D in Mio. CHF 0.08 0.28 0.42 0.02 -0.02 0.41 -0.01 -0.06 
VA in Mio. CHF 0.17 0.86 0.56 -0.02 -0.07 -0.04 -0.07 0.05 
Foreign 0.15 -0.07 -0.04 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.04 
Age -0.11 0.01 0.22 0.04 0.03 -0.15 -0.01 -0.01 
Price Competition 0.07 -0.03 0.00 -0.07 -0.04 -0.18 -0.07 0.13 
Non-Price Competition -0.02 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.05 0.10 -0.01 -0.05 
Spinoff -0.02 -0.03 -0.01 0.09 0.06 0.04 0.03 -0.01 
Merger 0.16 0.19 0.16 0.17 0.02 0.05 0.13 0.04 
FDI 1990 0.04 -0.06 0.03 0.03 0.08 0.04 0.06 -0.14 
FDI 2000 0.03 0.02 -0.10 0.04 0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.03 
Location Old Europe 0.07 0.11 0.23 0.22 0.17 0.10 0.14 -0.13 
Location East Europe -0.03 -0.04 0.13 0.21 0.19 0.01 0.09 -0.01 
Location South Europe -0.04 -0.05 0.00 0.03 0.07 0.00 0.10 -0.05 
Location Russia 0.15 0.02 0.09 0.11 -0.02 0.04 0.17 -0.01 
Location USA 0.10 -0.03 0.16 0.25 0.04 0.11 0.13 -0.04 
Location Latin America 0.11 -0.02 0.14 0.10 0.05 0.17 0.07 -0.05 
Location China 0.13 -0.04 0.07 0.21 0.15 0.17 0.19 -0.23 
Location Asia I 0.14 -0.01 0.03 0.13 0.08 0.06 0.01 -0.06 
Location Asia II 0.17 0.05 0.17 0.15 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.04 
Location Other 0.04 -0.03 0.07 0.12 0.03 0.14 0.00 0.03 
Input Share -0.14 0.02 0.09 -0.03 -0.07 -0.05 -0.07 -0.02 
Average Wage Total 0.61 -0.04 -0.13 0.07 0.21 0.28 -0.04 0.04 
Mean Insourcing Share 0.02 -0.17 -0.16 0.13 0.34 -0.01 0.05 0.06 
Notes: The table displays the correlation of dependent variables and main explanatory variables among themselves and with the control variables. 
 
